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Former Insiders’ Trading 
Erik Johannesson 
Using detailed and unique data from Sweden, I show that former insiders trade profitably in the 
shares of companies with which they used to be affiliated. A trading strategy mimicking former 
insiders’ trading behavior yields abnormal returns of 7.6% per year. These returns are primarily 
driven by post-separation purchases rather than by sales. They do not reflect general stock-picking 
skills: former insiders earn significantly lower abnormal returns when trading in companies with 
which they have no affiliation. I show that former insiders’ informational advantage diminishes 
over time, but less so if they have ties to current insiders. The importance of such ties increases in 
the presence of value-relevant information. My results are consistent with former insiders 
benefiting from both a retained informational advantage and from inside information obtained 
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1.  Introduction 
Insider trading laws—rules prohibiting corporate insiders from trading on material non-
public information—aim to protect investors from “manipulative and deceptive practices […] in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security” (Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 17 CFR 
240.10B-5). Academic research argues that allowing insider trading may result in benefits such as 
improved managerial decisions (Bhide 1993), increased efficiency of allocations in the securities 
markets through signaling (Manne 1966, 2005), and the elimination of expenditures on search and 
verification of information (Carlton and Fischel 1983). The empirical evidence of benefits 
associated with allowing insider trading, however, is mixed. For example, Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002) show that initial enforcement of insider trading legislation is followed by a reduction in the 
cost of capital. Beny (2007) provides evidence that countries in which insider trading laws are 
more stringent have more liquid stock markets and more dispersed stock ownership. As discussed 
at length in Bainbridge (2014), the collective evidence of the academic literature on capital market 
effects of insider trading regulation seems to suggest that the proposed benefits outweigh the 
proposed costs. 
In most countries, insider trading legislation is centered around current insiders; once they 
have left the firm with which they were associated, former insiders are generally free to trade in 
its shares without further restrictions. Similarly, in most countries, current—but not former— 
insiders are required to disclose their trades in inside stock.1 Previous literature shows that current 
insiders use their informational advantage to earn abnormal returns when trading in inside stock 
(e.g., Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Aboody, Hughes, and Liu 2005; Huddart 
and Ke 2007; Skaife, Veenman, and Wangerin 2013). Whether or not this extends to former 
                                                          
1 For example, current U.S. insiders are required to disclose any changes in holdings of inside stock within two days, 




insiders has, to my knowledge, not been addressed in the literature thus far. Recently declassified 
insiders are likely more similar to current insiders than to typical retail investors, in terms of the 
information they possess or are able to obtain. It could therefore be argued that former insiders 
should be subject to similar monitoring and disclosure requirements as current insiders, following 
declassification, to ensure equal access to information in the capital markets.2 
In this paper, I investigate whether former insiders continue to enjoy an informational 
advantage post-separation, a question which ought to be relevant to regulators, policymakers and 
authorities charged with enforcing insider trading laws. Specifically, I investigate the extent to 
which former insiders trade in what was previously considered inside stock and whether or not 
they earn abnormal returns on such trades. First, I document the prevalence and magnitude of 
abnormal returns that former insiders gain by trading in inside stock. Second, I try to distinguish 
between the mechanisms of having access to private information and possessing general stock-
picking skills. Third, I attempt to establish the relative importance of retained and obtained 
informational advantages for former insiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns on inside stock.3 
Former insiders may depart with private information that is directly relevant to the value 
of the company with which they used to be affiliated. They may also continue to have ties to 
current insiders and may use these ties, in a tipper-tippee relationship, to obtain private 
information.4 Finally, former insiders may have developed firm-specific analytical abilities and/or 
                                                          
2 Many proposed benefits of allowing insider trading are unlikely to apply to insider trading by former insiders. By 
contrast, the costs associated with insider trading, such as reduced investor confidence, are likely applicable to former-
insider trading.  
3 Under the current U.S. legal regime, the source of former insiders’ private information matters—trades based on 
private information that insiders retain from the inside are easier for the SEC to prosecute than trades based on private 
information obtained after departure, all else equal. This provides additional motivation to investigate the time-series 
properties of any informational advantage that former insiders have. 
4 For example, on January 23, 2017, Bloomberg News reported that the former CEO of the Swedish tech company 
Fingerprint Cards had been arrested for insider trading after authorities had grown suspicious of large-scale sales of 




depart with private information that is indirectly relevant to the value of the company, such as 
information that allows them to better interpret and contextualize future public information. It is 
by no means clear, ex ante, what the dominating mechanism is. 
Using detailed and unique data from Sweden, where individual investors’ trades can be 
systematically traced in a way that is not possible in the U.S., I show that former insiders earn 
abnormal returns when trading in inside stock.5 A calendar-time portfolio strategy leads to 
annualized four-factor alphas of 6.0% for purchases and 1.7% for sales. The former is significantly 
different from zero, in both a statistical and an economic sense, and motivates a focus on former 
insiders’ purchases. These results are consistent with the literature on current insiders, which 
largely finds open-market transactions to yield abnormal returns only for purchases, not for sales 
(e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003; Ravina and Sapienza 2010). 
The lack of results for insiders’ sales is commonly attributed to sales driven by insiders’ need for 
liquidity and portfolio diversification.  
The granularity of my dataset, which accounts for 100% of each included company’s 
ownership structure, allows me to compare former insiders’ trades in inside stock to trades in stock 
of companies with which they were never affiliated (“outside stock”). I use these trades as person-
specific counterfactuals to separate general stock-picking skills from other plausible mechanisms. 
Former insiders earn significantly larger abnormal returns on inside stock than on outside stock; 
in fact, they earn zero abnormal returns on outside stock. My results are hence more consistent 
with former insiders benefiting from a firm-specific informational advantage than with former 
insiders possessing superior stock-picking skills. 
                                                          
release of the profit warning. A current board member, suspected of having passed on inside information to the former 
CEO, was also arrested (Bloomberg News 2017).  
5 The disclosure requirement may, in fact, have a deterrent effect on former insiders, implying that my results may 




To separate retained informational advantages from obtained informational advantages, I 
investigate the role of time since declassification and of having ties to current insiders. Results 
show that the magnitude of abnormal returns on inside stock that former insiders earn reduces with 
time since declassification and does so gradually rather than immediately. Former insiders 
purchasing inside stock during the first, second, and third year after declassification earn abnormal 
returns of 10.4%, 6.1%, and 0.4%, respectively. In light of the gradual attenuation, I cautiously 
interpret these results as consistent with former insiders benefiting not only from a retained 
informational advantage, but also from obtained private information. This interpretation is 
reinforced by the positive association between abnormal returns and the number of remaining ties 
to current insiders that former insiders have at the time of trade. Specifically, the further away in 
time from the declassification date a trade takes place, the stronger the positive association between 
former insiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns and the number of ties to the inside they have. 
My study contributes to the academic literature on insider trading in two main ways. First, 
to my knowledge, this paper is the first to focus on how former insiders trade in inside stock post-
separation. My findings suggest that regulators ought to consider extending insider trading laws 
and/or disclosure requirements to cover former insiders, potentially for years after separation. 
Second, my results on the importance for former insiders of retaining ties to current insiders 
contributes to the literature on information transfers through social networks. Previous literature 
has shown social networks to be an important mechanism through which information is shared 
between interlocked boards, financial intermediaries, and other market participants (Cohen, 
Frazzini, and Malloy 2010, Larcker et al. 2005, Conyon and Muldoon 2006, Faccio 2006, Fisman 
et al.). I add to this stream of literature by providing evidence consistent with former insiders 




I document can be viewed as a quantification of the value for former insiders of remaining in the 
same network as current insiders. Collectively, and more broadly, I contribute by emphasizing that 
being a corporate insider is significantly more binary than having access to inside information.6 
2.  Institutional setting and data 
2.1 The Swedish equity market and setting  
The Swedish stock market, dating back to the 18th century, is a fully developed and 
modern market catering to both domestic and international investors. The main stock exchange, 
Nasdaq Stockholm, is part of the Nasdaq Nordic group. At the end of 2016, there were 
approximately 360 listed companies in Sweden with a total market value of SEK 6,479 billion, 
approximately USD 720 billion (Statistics Sweden). Of these, 67 were available to U.S. investors 
as ADRs, either via U.S. exchanges or U.S. OTC markets. Notable companies include Ericsson 
(telecommunications), Electrolux (domestic appliances), H&M (clothing), Skanska (construction 
and building materials), and Volvo (trucks and other vehicles). The Stockholm 30 index is 
among the top four most-traded blue chip indices in Europe (Nasdaq.com 2017).  
Insider trading regulation in Sweden closely resembles that of the U.S. The Market Abuse 
Act of 2005 (“Lag (2005:377) om straff för marknadsmissbruk vid handel med finansiella 
instrument,” MAA for brevity) states that certain corporate positions are automatically classified 
as insiders. These include board members, certain high-ranking officers, auditors, and shareholders 
owning more than 10% of a class of a company’s equity, along with their immediate family 
members (SFS 2000:1087). Any trading activity in inside stock by these persons must be promptly 
reported to the authorities. The explicit intent of this transparency is to deter corporate insiders 
                                                          
6 Throughout the paper, I refrain from taking a stand on whether the trading activities documented are legal. To prove 
culpa or dolus beyond reasonable doubt and show that a specific trade made by an individual former insider is unlawful 




from unlawful trading activities. In this regard, the Swedish regulatory environment is similar to 
its American counterpart (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
As for former insiders, the MAA states that anybody who knowingly possesses inside 
information is legally considered an insider. If a current insider transmits inside information to an 
outsider, the latter automatically becomes an insider in the eyes of the law and is barred from 
trading on this information. There is no legal distinction between trading based on private 
information retained and private information obtained, which contrasts with the U.S. legal setting 
(discussed further in Section 4).  
2.2 Data overview 
My empirical analyses use Swedish stock-ownership data, obtained via Euroclear Sweden, 
which clears virtually all transactions in listed Swedish companies. My dataset comprises quarterly 
holding balances of every person and entity owning Swedish stock, regardless of insider 
classification and regardless of whether the stock is held directly or indirectly.7 It captures a 
quarterly snapshot of each listed company’s ownership structure, down to the level of individual 
owners. This enables me to determine the net change in holdings for each shareholder of each 
listed company. 
Ownership data from Euroclear have been used in previous studies in accounting and 
finance, due in part to the unique way in which they allow researchers to identify individual 
owners.8 Specifically, Swedish companies are mandated to maintain an up-to-date record of their 
complete ownership structure, no older than three months (Aktiebolagslag 2005:551). This record 
is referred to as the “Book of Equity Owners” and constitutes public information: anybody may 
                                                          
7 Indirect ownership via foreign brokerages is shown in aggregated form. 
8 See, for example, Berkman, Koch, and Westerholm (2014), Kallunki, Nilsson, and Hellström (2009); Kallunki, 





visit the headquarters of a Swedish company and ascertain the current ownership structure, down 
to the level of individual investors.9 Euroclear collects and aggregates these public data into one 
database. Nearly all listed Swedish companies use Euroclear’s services to comply with the 
mandated record-keeping. At their Stockholm headquarters, Euroclear provides dedicated 
computer terminals, which the public may use to determine whether a certain individual or entity 
owns a particular stock.  
In contrast to its Swedish counterpart, the American setting provides little insight into 
companies’ ownership structure. Generally, data on stock ownership are not public information in 
the U.S. There are a few notable exceptions in which stock-ownership information is public, 
primarily for persons or entities likely to possess or have access to private information. For 
example, corporate insiders—directors, officers, and investors owning more than 10% of a class 
of a company’s equity—are required to file a Form 3 the first time they acquire inside stock. 
Subsequent changes to their holdings are to be reported on Form 4 (Securities and Exchange 
Commission: Forms 3, 4, 5). This is public information. In addition, institutional investment 
managers with equity assets of at least $100 million are required to file a Form 13F every quarter 
to disclose any long equity positions they currently possess. However, apart from these and a few 
other exceptions, equity ownership is a private matter in the U.S.: not even the issuer knows who 
its owners are or what its ownership structure looks like. Researchers interested in individual-level 
ownership data are confined to corporate insiders or institutional investors, or data subsets of retail 
investors acquired from brokerages (see, for example, Barber and Odean 2000). In this regard, the 
Euroclear dataset holds a distinct advantage—it comprises 100% of the ownership structure due 
                                                          




to its completeness. An additional advantage is that it can be merged with other datasets via 
common identifiers. 
One such dataset used in this paper comes from Sweden’s financial supervisory authority, 
Finansinspektionen (FI). FI maintains a registry of all corporate insiders in Sweden, dating back 
to the year 2000, and tracks their starting date, their ending date, and the name of the company for 
which they worked. The FI dataset also contains the position that each insider held, and in cases 
of multiple positions, their respective start date and end date. Most important, it also contains the 
same identifiers as the Euroclear dataset.  
Reporting requirements for corporate insiders in Sweden and the U.S. are similar. In both 
countries, an insider must report any trading activity in insider stock to the authorities (FI and the 
SEC, respectively) within five days after the transaction took place (two days in the U.S) (SFS 
2000:1087, Securities and Exchange Commission: Forms 3, 4, 5). Transparency is comparable for 
current insiders, but it differs once the individual ceases to be an insider: in the U.S., former 
insiders’ trades can no longer be observed, whereas in Sweden, former insiders’ net trading 
behavior is still observable, albeit only quarterly.10 This disclosure may have a deterrent effect on 
former insiders, implying that my results may be understated relative to what they would have 
been in a U.S. setting, all else being equal.  
In addition to the data sources described above, I use daily stock price data from the 
Swedish database FinBas and the book value of equity data from Compustat Global. I obtain the 
risk-free rate from the Swedish central bank, Riksbanken. Lastly, I use IBES for analyst forecasts 
of quarterly earnings. 
                                                          
10 Section 16 filers—a term which is typically used interchangeably with “insiders”—must still file Section 16 reports 
for transactions occurring within a period of less than six months of any opposite-way transaction that took place while 




Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample, which consists of the intersection 
of the Euroclear, FI, and FinBas datasets.11  As expected, the former insiders in my sample sell 
inside stock more often than they buy inside stock (with 5438 sales and 3470 purchases, 
respectively). The imbalance presumably derives from previous endowments. The time-series 
spans Q1 2006 through Q4 2015 and contains data on 4,673 former insiders from 361 unique 
companies. Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics regarding the quarterly (raw) returns to 
the trades that former insiders make. It shows that raw returns following an increase in insiders’ 
holdings are significantly larger than zero, for both inside stock (i.e. stock of the company at which 
the person is/was an insider, depending on specification) and outside stock. By contrast, raw 
returns following a decrease in insiders’ holdings are positive for outside stock and negative for 
inside stock. As a point of reference, the average quarterly return on the Swedish stock market 
over the relevant period was 2.25%, which closely mimics the average raw returns on the two 
portfolios containing outside stock. Although preliminary, this result indicates that any trading 
advantage that insiders have regarding inside stock does not necessarily apply to outside stock. 
This issue will be revisited in Section 3 below. 
Table 2, Panel B augments Panel A and presents quarterly market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for the former insiders in my sample. On average, increases in former insiders’ 
stock holdings are followed by positive abnormal returns. This is true for both outside and inside 
stock. Table 2, Panel B also shows that former insiders’ abnormal returns are smaller than those 
of current insiders. This result is expected, given that current insiders have larger informational 
endowments and thus greater potential to time their trades well, either by making profitable trades 
or by avoiding unprofitable trades. It is also worth noting that the use of performance-based equity 
                                                          




awards may result in an endogenous relationship between holding increases during tenure and 
abnormal returns. This would be the case if performance-based stock were awarded in one quarter, 
and news of high performance were disclosed in the subsequent quarter.  
Returning to former insiders, Table 2, Panel B shows that decreases in holdings are 
followed by significantly negative market-adjusted abnormal returns, consistent with insiders also 
timing their sales well. This result is slightly unexpected, given the lack of significant results in 
prior literature on current insiders’ selling (Jeng et al. 2003), but reinforces the conclusion drawn 
from the preliminary results regarding purchases: former insiders seem to time their trades in inside 
stock well.  
Table 3, Panels A-D show additional descriptive statistics of former insiders, of their 
purchases and sales of inside and outside stock, and of the companies in which they trade. Average 
abnormal returns, in dollar terms, amount to 23,479 (inside purchases) and 5,930 (inside sales), 
compared to 565 for outside purchases and 737 for outside sales. Based on the descriptive statistics 
in Table 3, the distribution of dollar abnormal returns is flatter for outside stock than for inside 
stock. Furthermore, the distribution of dollar abnormal returns pertaining to purchases of inside 
stock appears to be skewed to the right. A preliminary interpretation consistent with these empirics 
is that former insiders not only know when to buy but also when not to buy inside stock.  
With respect to trade size, Table 3 shows that inside trades are larger than outside trades, 
on average. This may reflect former insiders’ greater confidence in their trading decision, or, in 





3.  Abnormal returns to former insiders’ trading 
3.1 Risk measurement and counterfactuals 
My main tests are based on calendar-time portfolios, designed to mimic the trading 
behavior of former insiders with certain characteristics.12 I use daily return data and rebalance the 
portfolios quarterly. To control for known covariances of returns, the daily raw portfolio returns 
are regressed on a portfolio representing market returns minus the risk-free rate, the size and book-
to-market factors SMB and HML (Fama and French 1993), and the momentum factor UMD 
(Carhart 1997). SMB, HML, and UMD are not publicly available for the Swedish equity market, 
prompting me to create these factors myself.13  
To assess whether any abnormal returns derive from an informational advantage or from 
stock-picking skills, I compare the returns that former insiders earn on inside stock to the returns 
that former insiders earn on outside stock. I define outside stock as stock of companies at which 
the former insider has never been an insider between 2000 and 2016 (the boundaries derive from 
data limitations). The primary advantage of this counterfactual is that it holds the individual former 
insider constant. Hence, any difference in returns earned on inside and outside stock cannot be 
attributed to differential skill levels.  
3.2 Former insiders and inside stock: buy, sell, and hedge portfolios 
I proceed by devising a trading strategy that mimics former insiders’ observable change in 
ownership of inside stock from one quarter to another, separately for increases and decreases in 
holdings. This results in one Buy portfolio and one Sell portfolio. These portfolios are held for one 
quarter, after which the procedure is repeated and the portfolios are rebalanced.  
                                                          
12 See Fama (1998), Loughran and Ritter (2000), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) for the merits and drawbacks of 
the calendar-time portfolio approach to risk-adjustments relative to buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
13 Substituting the Fama-French European Factors, available on Kenneth French’s website, do not materially change 





Assuming an equal dollar investment in each stock, the portfolio return on date t, Rpt, is 
calculated as ∑n(xist × Rist)/∑n(xist), where Rist is the gross date t return on stock s for insider i, n is 
the number of stocks in the portfolio, and xist is the compounded daily return of stock s for insider 
i from the day of portfolio formation through day t–1. The variable xist equals 1 for all stocks the 
day after portfolio formation. Abnormal returns are calculated as the intercept from the OLS 
regression:  
Rpt – Rft = a + b1(Rmt – Rft) + b2SMBt + b3HMLt + b4UMDt + et    
where Rp is the daily portfolio return, Rf is the risk-free rate, and Rm is the value-weighted market 
index return. The remaining covariates represent factor-mimicking portfolios capturing the effects 
of size, book-to-market, and momentum. SMB is the small minus big (market value of equity) 
portfolio return, HML is the high minus low (book-to-market value of equity) portfolio return, and 
UMD is the up minus down (past yearly stock price movement) portfolio return. The calendar-
time portfolio approach closely follows that of Barber et al. (2006), Barber et al. (2007), and 
Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009). 
Table 4 presents the results. Raw returns for the Buy, Sell and for the long-short (Buy-Sell) 
portfolios are positive on average (Columns 1-3), and they are distinctly larger for the Buy 
portfolio compared to the Sell portfolio. The risk-adjusted abnormal returns for the Buy portfolio 
(Column 4) amount to 6.0% on an annualized basis, assuming 252 trading days per year. The 
results are strongly indicative of former insiders earning abnormal returns when buying inside 
stock after their tenure has ended.  
Although not statistically significant, the annualized raw returns of 5.2% for the Sell 
portfolio in Column 2 are inconsistent with former insiders strategically selling before large stock 




statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. I hypothesize that this is due to noise stemming 
from liquidity and diversification trades, as discussed in Section 1: the signal I seek to isolate does 
not seem strong enough to dominate the noise. 
Columns 3 and 6 show results for the long-short portfolio Buy-Sell. The annualized raw 
return is 8.4% and is strongly statistically significant (t = 4.63). Adjusting for common risk factors 
yields an alpha of 7.6% (t = 4.42). These abnormal returns are both statistically and economically 
significant and provide further evidence consistent with former insiders earning abnormal returns 
when trading in the stock of companies with which they used to be affiliated.  
Collectively, the results in Table 4 show that the abnormal returns that former insiders earn 
on inside stock are concentrated to purchases rather than to sales, consistent with prior literature 
on insider trading (Lakonishok and Lee 2001, Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003, Ravina and 
Sapienza 2010). What Table 4 does not show, however, is the source behind the abnormal returns 
documented; this is addressed next. 
3.3 Informational advantage or general stock-picking skills?  
I attempt to discern the extent to which the abnormal returns former insiders earn by trading in 
inside stock can be attributed to the following mechanisms, which are not mutually exclusive:  
i) general stock-picking skills 
ii) an obtained informational advantage 
iii) a retained informational advantage.  
Point iii) above could be further decomposed into retained stock-specific analytical abilities and 
retained stock-specific private information: former insiders may have greater abilities to interpret 
the information received through public disclosure (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia 1991), or they may 




1985). These two alternative mechanisms are inherently difficult to separate, and in this paper, I 
do not attempt to do so. I instead focus on the issue of whether former insiders obtain an 
informational advantage post-separation, which ought to be the more relevant issue for regulators 
and policymakers.  
As a first step, I investigate the extent to which my data supports mechanism i) above, 
general stock-picking skills. If the abnormal returns documented in Table 4 resulted from general 
stock-picking skills, such skills would presumably manifest themselves not only for trades in 
inside stock but also for trades in outside stock. To test this, I create portfolios based on changes 
in holdings of former insiders’ outside stock.14 This introduces a tradeoff between sample size and 
proximity in time: the more closely in time I require outside trades to occur in relation to inside 
trades, the smaller the sample size. I analyze the following three (sub)samples separately: the first 
subsample contains purchases (sales) of outside stock that occur in the same quarter as a purchase 
(sale) of inside stock, for a given former insider. The second subsample consists of purchases 
(sales) of outside stock that occur in the period [q-4, q+4] relative to a purchase (sale) of inside 
stock in quarter q. These two subsamples are hence conditioned on the existence of more or less 
concurrent inside and outside trades for each included former insider, and I omit any inside trades 
for which there are no corresponding outside trade, and vice versa. The third subsample consists 
of the full set of former insiders’ outside trades, which I compare to the full set of former insiders’ 
inside trades, regardless of timing.  
I construct hedge portfolios by going long the portfolio consisting of inside stocks and short 
the portfolio with outside stocks. The hedge portfolios, constructed as in Table 4, hence compare 
the returns to purchases and sales in holdings of inside stock to those of outside stock. Results are 
                                                          




presented in Table 5 (purchases) and Table 6 (sales).  Each table is further divided into three panels, 
showing results corresponding to the three (sub)samples described above. The first column in 
Tables 5 and 6 presents the average annualized return for outside stock, and the second column 
shows returns for inside stock. For ease of comparison, in the third column I replicate the results 
of Column 1, Table 4, which shows returns for a portfolio consisting of all inside trades, regardless 
of whether there was a concurrent outside trade. 
Table 5, Column 1 shows that former insiders earn raw returns of 7.4% (Panel A) to 9.2% 
(Panel C) when they buy outside stocks. Columns 4 through 7, however, make it clear that former 
insiders earn larger returns on their purchases of inside stock than on their purchases of outside 
stock. The difference ranges from 4.4% to 7.2% with significance levels better than 1% in all 
specifications. This lends strong support to the interpretation that former insiders do not possess 
general stock-picking skills. 
The results for former insiders’ sales of inside and outside stock in Table 6 show that sales 
of outside stock, on average, are followed by higher returns than sales of inside stock, but the risk-
adjusted difference is only significant in one of six specifications (see Columns 6 and 7). This is 
consistent with former insiders being as likely to sell inside stock that experiences negative future 
returns as to sell outside stock that experiences negative future returns.15 Table 6 hence fails to 
provide compelling evidence that former insiders earn greater returns selling inside stock than 
selling outside stock. This result contradicts the preliminary market-adjusted results in Table 2, 
Panel B, but is in line with results for current insiders’ sales (Jeng et al. 2003, Johannesson and 
Kim 2018). To reiterate, I hypothesize that the lack of result for former insiders’ sales is due to 
noise stemming from liquidity and portfolio diversification trades. 
                                                          
15 Or, conversely, as likely to sell inside stock that experiences positive future returns as to sell outside stock that 




Viewed collectively, the results in Tables 5 and 6 do not support the idea that former 
insiders are equally good at trading outside stock as they are at trading inside stock. Any superior 
stock-picking skills that former insiders possess do not seem to be general: the evidence presented 
is not consistent with former insiders earning abnormal returns on inside stock because they 
possess superior stock-picking skills that apply to the whole universe of stocks.  
4.  Retained or obtained informational advantage 
4.1 The distinction between obtained and retained information 
Additional motivation for exploring the mechanisms behind the abnormal returns that 
former insiders earn on inside stock derives from intricacies of the U.S. legal system. The purpose 
of this section is to show that trading based on transmitted private information is a contested area 
of the law, and that prosecution of former insiders seems to depend on the source and timing of 
the information transmitted, in the current U.S. legal regime.   
In many countries, such as the U.K. and Sweden, trading on inside information is illegal, 
regardless of how the inside information was acquired. This is not the case in the U.S., where a 
breach of fiduciary trust is a prerequisite, a result of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 
Dirks v. SEC (1983). Dirks implicitly assumes that former insiders are still considered bound by 
fiduciary trust regarding material private information they retain upon departure. Similar language 
is typically found in insiders’ contracts, explicitly prohibiting them from trading on any private 
information retained until it has entered the public domain or become redundant. By contrast, 
private information that former insiders obtain after declassification, through a tipper-tippee 
relationship, would not automatically lead to assumptions of fiduciary trust or duty on the part of 




be successfully prosecuted for insider trading under the current U.S. legal paradigm (Bainbridge 
2014). 
A number of famous U.S. court cases shed light on the ambiguity of conditioning 
prosecution of insider trading on the breaching of fiduciary trust. See Appendix A1 for a brief 
overview. Suffice to say here that, even if detected by the monitoring systems that the exchanges 
and the SEC already have in place, trading based on transmitted inside information may be difficult 
to successfully prosecute. In light of this additional motivation, the empirical analyses below 
should also be of interest to legal scholars debating the adequacy, relevance, and necessity of the 
breach of fiduciary trust requirement for successful prosecution of insider trading. 
4.2 The time-series pattern of abnormal returns  
I proceed to investigate whether the abnormal returns that former insiders earn on inside 
stock derive from a retained or obtained informational advantage by first exploring the time-series 
pattern of the abnormal returns documented above. I partition former insiders’ inside trades based 
on the time between declassification and the trade, the idea being that trades based on a retained 
informational advantage likely come earlier than trades based on obtained value-relevant 
information. It is well to not that if abnormal returns earned on inside stock vary with time since 
declassification, this would be inconsistent with the mechanism of general stock-picking skills, 
discussed in the previous section. Such skills presumably exhibit low time variation. 
Table 7 shows abnormal returns for calendar-time portfolio strategies which mimic former 
insiders’ trades in inside stock, grouped according to when they occur in relation to the quarter of 
declassification. Panel A shows purchases, Panel B shows sales, and Panel C shows results for the 




the second partition contains trades made in quarter 5-8, and so on.16 Figure 1 graphically depicts 
how the abnormal returns vary across partitions. 
Table 7, Panel A shows that the abnormal returns documented in Table 4 likely are driven 
by purchases that occur relatively soon after declassification (10.4% and 6.1% annualized 
abnormal returns for purchases observed 1-4 and 5-8 quarters after declassification, respectively). 
The last three partitions, corresponding to purchases observed 9-20 quarters after declassification, 
fail to show significant abnormal returns. Since abnormal returns are not solely clustered in the 
immediate near-term after declassification, but rather exhibit a drift, I cautiously interpret the 
evidence as supportive of former insiders trading also on obtained value-relevant information. In 
a relative sense, it seems less plausible that undisclosed value-relevant information could be 
retained by a departing insider and still be value-relevant and undisclosed four to eight quarters 
later. This argument could be extended to three, two, and possibly even one quarter after 
declassification, but given the limited overall sample size, the resulting portfolios would be too 
small for such analyses. It is not clear to me whether this reasoning applies also to retained firm-
specific abilities to contextualize public information. Concrete, alternative means through which 
former insiders could obtain private information would add further validity to the mechanism of 
obtained private information. This will be further investigated in Section 4.3. 
Turning next to the results for sales of inside stock in Panel B, there are no significant 
abnormal returns for any partition. Table 7, Panel B does show small negative abnormal returns 
for two of the partitions, consistent with well-timed sales, but they do not meet the hurdle of 
statistical significance. Again, this result is not surprising given the evidence in Jeng et al. (2003) 
and Johannesson and Kim (2018), which show that current insiders’ sales of inside stock are 
                                                          
16 Ideally, I would have created one calendar-time portfolio per quarter-since-declassification, but this would have 




generally not followed by negative abnormal returns. Insiders’ portfolios tend to be over-
concentrated in inside stock (Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen 2005; Becker 2006).17 
Newly declassified former insiders would thus be inclined to sell inside stock shortly after 
declassification, for diversification reasons. Selling for diversification and/or liquidity reasons 
would dilute any signal coming from informed trades. An explanation that is consistent with the 
(lack of) results for the Sell portfolios’ abnormal return pattern in Table 7 is that there are two 
offsetting forces, both of which deteriorate with time. If former insiders’ informational advantage 
(either retained or obtained) is largest shortly after declassification and deteriorates with time, any 
information-based trades may be drowned by noise trades from newly declassified former insiders 
rebalancing their portfolios or selling for liquidity reasons. This implies that, with the passage of 
time, both the informational advantage and the non-informational, dilutive trades would diminish, 
possibly continuing to negate each other. Based on this reasoning, I note that an abnormal returns 
pattern consistent with the general stock-picking skills mechanism would show low abnormal 
returns shortly after declassification (because of information dilution) and increase with the 
passage of time, as fewer and fewer former insiders divest excess inside stock. This pattern is not 
observable in Table 7, adding to the evidence in Section 3. 
Applying the above reasoning to former insiders who buy inside stock may help explain 
the buy signal’s strength: a newly declassified former insider likely is more heavily concentrated 
in inside stock relative to a former insider declassified long ago. For diversification reasons, he or 
she may hence be less prone to invest in inside stock, ceteris paribus. This implies that purchases 
of inside stock made by newly declassified former insiders should be more informative of future 
abnormal returns than similar purchases made long after declassification. 
                                                          




Collectively, the evidence presented thus far is consistent with former insiders obtaining 
private value-relevant information after declassification, but I have not convincingly ruled out the 
alternative explanation of insiders retaining informational advantages, either due to retained 
private information or due to retained firm-specific analytical abilities. Evidence of potential 
alternative channels through which private information may be obtained would help disentangle 
the two mechanisms. This will be explored in Section 4.3. I conclude this subsection by 
summarizing my findings thus far: former insiders seem to earn abnormal returns, which are not 
only statistically but also economically significant, when trading in inside stock. Given the lack of 
results in Section 3 regarding general stock-picking skills, this points to former insiders benefiting 
from either firm-specific stock-picking skills or unequal access to information. My inability to rule 
out the latter ought to be of interest to regulators and policymakers.  
4.3 Decoupling the mechanisms of retained and obtained informational advantages 
The evidence of former insiders trading on an obtained informational advantage has thus 
far been indirect, in the sense that I have not been able to rule out this mechanism. For more direct 
support, I next investigate a plausible channel through which former insiders obtain private 
information, post-separation. In doing so, I also provide corroborating evidence on previous results 
using a different research design. Results in this section derive from quarterly market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, which allow me to investigate cross-sectional variation in former 
insiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns in ways that would not be feasible using calendar-time 
portfolios, due to the limited size of my sample.18  
 As a prelude to my multivariate tests, Table 8 shows correlation matrices for the 
subsamples containing former insiders’ purchases of inside stock (Panel A) and sales of inside 
                                                          
18 I refrain from taking a stand in the debate over which methodology is superior, buy-and-hold abnormal returns or 




stock (Panel B). Pearson correlations are presented above the diagonal, and Spearman correlations 
below. The main continuous variables used in subsequent tests, defined in Exhibit 1, are included. 
My primary variables of interest are Ties (the number of persons, with whom the former insider 
concurrently served, who still remain insiders at the time of trade) and AfterDays (the number of 
days between declassification and the time at which I observe a change in holdings).  
As expected, Ties is negatively correlated with AfterDays. AfterDays, per the analyses in 
Section 4.2, is in turn negatively correlated with abnormal returns. Intuitively, both the number of 
ties to remaining insiders and the ability to generate abnormal returns on inside stock—regardless 
of mechanism—likely deteriorates with time since declassification. The magnitude of the 
correlation, approximately 30%, indicates that the interaction effects between Ties and AfterDays 
are worth investigating.  
 I first proceed to a multivariate setting without interactions and analyze the effects of all 
main variables on next-quarter market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns. I estimate the 
following regression (indices i, j, and t represent former insiders, firms, and time, respectively), 
with results shown in Table 9. 
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1Tiesi,j,t + b2AfterDaysi,j,t + b3#Insidershipsi,j,t + b4HighPositioni,j,t + 
b5TradeSizei,j,t + b6BMj,t + b7BHAR_lagj,t + b8MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
Regarding purchases of inside stock, Table 9 shows that the coefficient on Ties is significantly 
positive (t = 1.82), implying that a former insider who has more ties at the time of trade earns 
higher abnormal returns in the quarter following purchase, all else equal. As expected, the 
coefficient on AfterDays is significantly negative (t = 2.07). #Insiderships (defined as the number 
of companies at which a given former insider has had an inside position, in the sample period) is 





returns on inside stock. I speculate that this may be due to higher reputational costs and/or lower 
marginal utility of additional wealth. Omitting #Insiderships from Equation (2) renders 
HighPosition (defined as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the former insider was a 
CEO, vice president, and/or board member at the company at which he or she was an insider) 
significantly negative, which lends further support in favor of this conjecture. Lastly, the strong 
positive effect of TradeSize (defined as the natural logarithm of the value of the trade, in Swedish 
krona) is consistent with insiders investing more if they are more confident in their private 
information and/or abilities.  
 Turning next to sales of inside stock, Table 9 shows that former insiders’ sales are generally 
not followed by significantly negative abnormal returns. The intercept, although negative, is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, any ability to time sales of inside stock deteriorates with 
time, as evidenced by a positive and strongly significant coefficient on AfterDays (t = 4.81). One 
interpretation is that the further away from the declassification date a former insider moves, the 
less likely he or she is to avoid selling prior to future positive abnormal returns. The coefficient on 
Ties is also significantly positive. This is inconsistent with former insiders receiving private 
information through these ties prior to a stock price decline, but consistent with former insiders 
selling stock soon after declassification, when the number of ties retained is presumably large. 
Finally, one can note the strong significance of the lagged BHAR variable (t = 8.83). Prior 
literature has shown that current insiders tend to sell after a stock-price run-up (Jeng et al. 2003). 
This explanation, coupled with residual returns momentum, would be consistent with the observed 
empirics. Together with the evidence in Section 4.2, the lack of support for negative abnormal 




insiders’ sales of inside stock seems too fraught with confounding factors for any inferences to be 
made. 
 As prefaced by the correlations in Table 8, investigating whether ties to the inside constitute 
a credible mechanism through which former insiders earn abnormal returns necessitates attention 
to the relationship between AfterDays and Ties. Before proceeding to a multivariate and interactive 
setting, I independently sort the sample of former insiders’ purchases of inside stock on AfterDays 
and Ties into quintiles. Table 10 shows that average market-adjusted abnormal returns increase 
monotonically in Ties for the first three quintiles, but not for the last two. I interpret this as 
consistent with a decreasing marginal benefit of having ties to the inside for former insiders. The 
difference in average abnormal returns between the extreme quintiles is 3.0 percentage points (t = 
3.57). The relation between average market-adjusted abnormal returns and the AfterDays quintiles 
exhibits strict monotonicity, with a difference in average abnormal returns between the extreme 
quintiles of -1.5 percentage points (t = 1.81). 
 I continue to investigate the effects of Ties and AfterDays on former insiders’ ability to 
generate abnormal returns by using the quintiles described above in a multivariate setting. Unlike 
Equation 2, Equation 3 takes into consideration the interactive effects of Ties and AfterDays. The 
variables in 3a are defined as before; AfterDays_Q and Ties_Q are discrete variables with values 
ranging from 0 through 4 to indicate which AfterDay and Tie quintile an observation belongs to; 
AfterDays_Qi and Ties_Qi (i in {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), are indicator variables for AfterDays and Ties 
quintiles, respectively. In total, Table 11 shows results for six specifications nested in Equations 
3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d. 
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3AfterDaysi,j,t×Tiesi,j,t + b4BMj,t + 






BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1AfterDays_Qi,j,t + b2Ties_Qi,j,t + b3AfterDays_Qi,j,t×Ties_Qi,j,t + 
b4BMj,t + b5BHAR_lagj,t + b6MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1Tiesi,j,t + b2AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + b3AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + 
b4AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b5AfterDays_Q5i,j,t + b6Tiesi,j,t×AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + 
b7Tiesi,j,t×AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + b8Tiesi,j,t×AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b9Tiesi,j,t×AfterDaysQ5i,j,t + 
b10BMj,t + b11BHAR_ lagj,t + b12MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1Ties_Qi,j,t + b2AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + b3AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + 
b4AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b5AfterDays_Q5i,j,t + b6Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + 
b7Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + b8Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + 
b9Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q5i,j,t + b10BMj,t + b11BHAR_ lagj,t +  b12MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
Table 11 supports that former insiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns on inside stock is positively 
associated with the number of ties they retain and negatively associated with time passed since 
declassification. This result holds for specifications using the AfterDays and Ties quintiles as well 
as for specifications using the corresponding continuous variables. Furthermore, Columns 3-6 
show evidence consistent with Ties becoming more important with the passage of time.19 The 
negative association between abnormal returns and AfterDays is positively modified by the number 
of ties to current insiders that the former insider has at the time of the trade. For example, Column 
6 shows that in the lowest AfterDays quintile (i.e. the quintile with former insiders most recently 
declassified), the effect of having more ties to current insiders is close to zero. The consistently 
negative coefficients on the AfterDays quintile indicator variables show that having few ties 
becomes more and more “costly” with the passage of time. Finally, the interactions are consistently 
positive and with increasing statistical significance, supporting that the importance of having ties 
to the inside increases with time since declassification.  
                                                          







Returning to the part of this paper’s motivation that derives from the intricacies of the U.S. 
legal system, the consistent evidence regarding Ties presented in Tables 9-11 lends more direct 
support for the alternative mechanism of information transmission, or tipping. If these trades had 
occurred in the U.S., the SEC would have had to establish a breach of fiduciary trust or 
misappropriation of private information on the part of the tipper, in order to successfully prosecute 
the tippee, which may be a non-trivial hurdle. Under the assumption that former insiders in the 
U.S. act similarly to former insiders in Sweden, removing the breach of fiduciary trust requirement 
established in Dirks would hence have real-world consequences. It is possible that removing the 
breach of fiduciary trust requirement may better align the legal regime with policy favored by the 
Supreme Court. As stated in Nagy (2008): “Taken together, Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan 
evidence a Supreme Court willing to stretch fiduciary principles to no small degree, when doing 
so facilitates a desirable policy outcome.” 
4.4 Future value-relevant information and the probability of buying 
To further corroborate my results, and to introduce a specific role for information, I next 
address how the existence of value-relevant information affects former insiders’ propensity to 
trade. This extends the analysis in the previous subsection insofar that it recognizes that keeping 
ties to current insiders is a necessary but not sufficient condition for profitable trading: there must 
exist value-relevant information for the kept ties to transmit. Stated differently, proximity to the 
inside, in terms of both time since declassification and ties retained, ought to benefit former 
insiders particularly when there is undisclosed information with high value-relevance. 
Based on the evidence in Elliott, Morse, and Richardson (1984), which shows that trading 
by current insiders occurs most frequently near unanticipated changes in earnings, I choose to 




to this information event.20 A similar test design is employed in Brochet (2010), using current 
insiders. I hand-collect IBES identifiers for the companies in my sample, linking by ISIN codes, 
company name, and organization number. This results in a sample of approximately 250 out of the 
original 361 companies. For these, I construct a market-based measure of unexpected quarterly 
earnings, denoted AnnRet, which is defined as the market return in a three-day window 
surrounding the quarterly earnings announcement.21  
 Using the linear probability model outlined in Equation 4, I investigate the probability of 
observing an increase in insider holdings among former insiders, as a function of time since 
declassification, ties retained, and unexpected quarterly earnings. The focus is on the latter 
construct, and, in particular, how it modifies the relationship between the probability of buying 
and AfterDays and Ties, respectively.  
 
P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3AnnRetj,t+1 + ei,j,t 
 
P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3AnnRetj,t+1 + 
b4AfterDaysi,j,t×AnnRetj,t+1 + b5Tiesi,j,t×AnnReti,j,t+1 + ei,j,t 
 
Table 12, Columns 1 and 2, show that, regardless of specification, AfterDays is strongly negatively 
associated and Ties is strongly positively associated with the probability of former insiders 
purchasing inside stock, consistent with prior results. Furthermore, before including the interaction 
terms, Column 1 shows that the announcement return variable AnnRet is significantly positively 
associated with the probability of buying (t = 2.09). This is perhaps expected given the previous 
                                                          
20 More recently, firm-specific policies restricting the timing of insider trades may prohibit such trading by current 
insiders (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon, 2000; Roulstone, 2003). 
21 Inspection of the underlying analyst forecasts shows that there are relatively few forecasts per company-quarter, 
and that the forecasts that do exist, on average, are quite stale. This is why I focus on the stock market’s reaction to 







results but seems to contradict the results in Brochet (2010) for current insiders.22 Interacting 
AnnRet with AfterDays and Ties do not yield the hypothesized results: Table 12, Column 2 shows 
that neither of the interactions are significant. This result is not consistent with former insiders 
using ties to obtain information about unexpected earnings. The association between having ties 
to the inside and the probability of purchasing inside stock does not seem to be affected by next-
period earnings surprises. 
I next extend the analysis of announcement returns to include any value-relevant news, 
without knowing exactly what they are, and relate them to the propensity of former insiders to buy 
inside stock. Specifically, I increase the return window from three days to one whole quarter, and 
investigate if the propensity to purchase inside stock is related to abnormal returns in the 
subsequent quarter.23 Concretely, I estimate the following equations: 
 P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3BHARj,t+1 + ei,j,t  
 P(Buyt = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3BHARj,t+1 + 
b4AfterDaysi,j,t×BHARj,t+1 + b5Tiesi,j,t×BHARj,t+1 + ei,j,t 
 
Results are presented in Table 12, Columns 3 and 4. As in the case of unexpected quarterly 
earnings in Columns 1-2, the effects of AfterDays and Ties continue to be significantly negative 
and positive, respectively, regardless of specification. Column 3 shows that next-quarter abnormal 
returns are positively associated with the probability that a former insider buys inside stock. 
                                                          
22 In Brochet (2010), Table 7, next-quarter earnings surprises pre-SOX is insignificantly positively associated with 
current insiders’ purchases of inside stock. The marginal effect of shifting from pre- to post-SOX is negative and 
weakly significant. The net association between next-quarter earnings and insiders’ purchases, post-SOX, is slightly 
negative but the significance level is not shown. Given the modest significance level of the marginal effect and that 
the main effect and the marginal effect are of opposing signs, it is likely that the net effect is indistinguishable from 
zero in a statistical sense.  
23 This test is akin to the perfect foresight measure in Francis and Schipper (1999) and to the tests concerning 





Interestingly, Column 4 shows that this effect reduces to zero in the absence of ties to current 
insiders. The coefficient on Tiesi,j,t×BHARj,t+1 is positive and strongly significant (t = 4.51), which 
I interpret as evidence consistent with ties being more important in the presence of value-relevant 
information, or, conversely, that value-relevant information is more valuable in the presence of 
ties to the inside.  
In a simplistic, final test of how Ties, AfterDays, and value-relevant information interact, I 
return to the quintiles created and described in Section 4.3. For each of the 25 permutations of the 
Ties quintiles and the AfterDays quintiles, I calculate the Pearson correlation between next-quarter 
abnormal returns, BHARj,t+1, and the probability of buying in quarter t, with results presented in 
Table 13, Panel A. Similarly, Table 13, Panel B shows estimates of the coefficient on BHARj,t+1 in 
Equation 5, for each of the 25 quintile permutations. 
 P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1BHARj,t+1 + ei,j,t 
 
Informally, both panels show that the association between future abnormal returns and the 
probability of purchase increases as one moves from left to right and down to up in the matrices. I 
cautiously interpret this as additional evidence consistent with future value-relevant information 
becoming increasingly more important to former insiders’ decision to buy inside stock as they 
have more ties to the inside.  
The purpose of this section was to further shed light on potential mechanisms through 
which former insiders earn abnormal returns on inside stock. The indirect evidence of former 
insiders trading not only using an informational advantage retained, but also on private 
information obtained, presented in Section 3, has been complemented with more direct support. 





current insiders, and with the value of ties kept increasing in the presence of value-relevant 
information.  
5.  Discussion of findings and conclusions 
This paper investigates the extent to which former insiders trade in the stock of companies 
with which they used to be affiliated. The inherent tension between the temptation to utilize any 
informational advantages and the prohibition to do so lends itself to interesting research. Using a 
comprehensive Swedish dataset, I show that former insiders, on average, earn abnormal returns 
which are both statistically and economically significant, when they trade in inside stock. A hedge 
portfolio of former insiders’ purchases and sales in inside stock results in annualized risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns of 7.6%. The effect is primarily driven by the long portfolio containing inside 
stock purchases. It is well to note that in the Swedish setting, former insiders’ trades are visible. 
This visibility may have a deterrent effect on former insiders, implying that my results may be 
understated relative to what they would have been in other settings, all else equal.  
Using a multitude of counterfactuals, I try to discern the primary mechanisms behind the 
documented abnormal returns. A test in which I gauge former insiders’ returns on inside stock 
against the return on their outside stock reveals that former insiders, on average, do not possess 
any significant general stock-picking skills. The seemingly deteriorating ability to earn abnormal 
returns, with respect to time since declassification, helps reinforce this conclusion. The relative 
longevity of the ability to earn abnormal returns on inside stock, up to eight quarters after 
declassification, is consistent with former insiders not only benefiting from a retained 
informational advantage, but also from an obtained informational advantage, when trading in 
inside stock after declassification. In the U.S., this distinction is important due to differences in 




successful prosecution of illegal insider trading. I hope that the results in this paper may further 
the ongoing legal debate on this requirement.  
Leaving the issue of retained versus obtained informational advantages aside, perhaps 
most important for regulators and policymakers is the fact that I manage to rule out the explanation 
of general stock-picking skills. Regardless of whether former insiders trade profitably in inside 
stock due to an informational advantage retained from the inside or obtained post-separation, this 
kind of trading belongs in a legal grey zone. The legalities of former insiders’ trades in inside stock 
and whether former insiders should be allowed to trade in inside stock only after a quarantine 
period—or at all—remains a largely unexplored area. The results and conclusions presented in this 





Exhibit 1: Variable definitions 
▪ TradeSize is the natural logarithm of the value of the trade, in Swedish krona. 
▪ BM is the book value of common equity divided by the market value of common equity 
at the beginning of the quarter. 
▪ BHARt+1 represents next-quarter quarterly market-adjusted abnormal returns. 
▪ MV denotes the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter.  
▪ AfterDays is the number of days between declassification and the time at which I 
observe a change in holdings. 
▪  Ties is the number of persons, with whom the former insider concurrently served, who 
still remain insiders at the time of trade.  
▪ #Insiderships is defined as the number of companies at which a given former insider 
has had an inside position, in the sample period. 
▪ HighPosition is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the former insider was (is) 
a CEO, vice president, and/or board member at the company at which he or she was 






Table 1: Sample description 
Panel A. Former insiders and trades in inside stock 
Unique insiders 4673 3344 2760 1719
Total number of trades NA 8908 5438 3470
Minimum observations/quarter 1037 166 87 49
Average observations/quarter 1231 234 143 91
Median observations/quarter 1254 227.5 138 92.5
Maximum observations/quarter 1345 356 234 131
Unique companies 361 337 327 292
Total number of quarters 39 38 38 38
Full sample of former 
insiders
Former insiders who 
trade in inside stock
Former insiders who sell 
inside stock




Panel B. Former insiders and trades in outside stock 
Unique insiders 2823 2692 2526
Total number of trades 126178 57349 68829
Minimum observations/quarter 1921 545 882
Average observations/quarter 3320 2504 1811
Median observations/quarter 3340.5 2823 1869
Maximum observations/quarter 4977 4977 2477
Unique companies 545 514 524
Total number of quarters 38 38 38
Outside trades by former 
insiders who trade in inside stock
Outside sales by former insiders 
who trade in inside stock
Outside buys by former insiders 
who trade in inside stock
 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for my sample of former insiders’ trades. Panel A shows statistics for former insiders who trade in stock of 




holdings (“purchases”) in the last two columns. Panel B shows statistics for trades in stock of companies with which the former insiders were never 
affiliated (“outside stock”). Trades included in Panel B are conditioned on the former insiders also trading (Column 1), selling (Column 2), or buying 





Table 2: Quarterly returns for trading insiders (during and after tenure as insider) 
Panel A. Quarterly raw returns for trading insiders (during and after tenure as insider) 
Outside stock Outside stock
During After During After
min -0.3656 -0.4288 -0.3732 -0.4089 -0.4187 -0.3729
max 0.5219 0.5022 0.4651 0.4539 0.4748 0.4456
mean 0.0446*** 0.0304*** 0.0259*** -0.011*** -0.0094*** 0.0215***
median 0.0404*** 0.0296*** 0.0202*** -0.0251*** -0.0217*** 0.0162***




Inside stock Inside stock
 
Table 2, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for unadjusted quarterly stock returns following an 
observed purchase or sale of inside stock and outside stock. “Inside stock” indicates stock of 
companies at which the person was an insider, “outside stock” indicates stock of companies with 
which the insider was never affiliated. Columns 1 and 4 show statistics for unadjusted quarterly 
returns on trades in inside stock earned during tenure. Columns 2 and 5 show statistics for unadjusted 
quarterly returns on trades in inside stock after tenure. Columns 3 and 6 show statistics for unadjusted 
quarterly returns on trades in outside stock. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are 
declassified as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside stock. The 
sample is based on the Swedish stock market and spans the period Q1, 2006 through Q4, 2015. 




Panel B. Quarterly market-adjusted abnormal returns for trading insiders (during and after tenure 
as insider) 
Outside stock Outside stock
During After During After
min -0.3047 -0.3653 -0.2931 -0.3518 -0.3628 -0.2931
max 0.4257 0.3945 0.3642 0.4032 0.4219 0.3774
mean 0.0318*** 0.0151*** 0.0071*** -0.0224*** -0.0226*** 0.0072***
median 0.0224*** 0.0081*** -0.0026*** -0.0316*** -0.0353*** -0.0023***






Table 2, Panel B augments Panel A and shows descriptive statistics for market-adjusted quarterly stock 
returns following an observed purchase or sale of inside stock and outside stock. “Inside stock” indicates 
stock of companies at which the person was an insider, “outside stock” indicates stock of companies with 
which the insider was never affiliated. Columns 1 and 4 show statistics for market-adjusted quarterly 
returns on trades in inside stock earned during tenure. Columns 2 and 5 show statistics for market-adjusted 
quarterly returns on trades in inside stock after tenure. Columns 3 and 6 show statistics for market-adjusted 
quarterly returns on trades in outside stock. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified 
as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside stock. The sample is based 
on the Swedish stock market and spans the period Q1, 2006 through Q4, 2015. Asterisks indicate statistical 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics of former insiders, trades, and companies 
Panel A
Inside stock, purchases
Mean Std Dev p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Former insider characteristics
Trade size ($) 129,438 1,481,575 289 2,186 9,656 34,997 264,225
Abnormal returns ($) 23,479 34,964 -1,572 83 855 4,186 38,418
Portfolio size ($) 1,388,698 68,538,677 4,006 29,760 111,975 402,238 2,879,507
Days between declassification 
and transaction
798 547 64 319 712 1245.5 1769
Firm characteristics
Market cap ($) 5,859,230,807 9,698,677,006 22,240,202 161,578,443 852,863,532 6,803,421,298 28,073,729,481




Mean Std Dev p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Former insider characteristics
Trade size ($) 188,593 1,358,187 612 6,066 21,758 75,143 487,060
Abnormal returns ($) 5,930 161,652 -21,897 -1,368 14 2,042 29,255
Portfolio size ($) 2,818,163 105,551,628 3,643 33,976 139,880 510,073 4,074,895
Days between declassification 
and transaction
756 536 59 276 666 1185 1717
Firm characteristics
Market cap ($) 2,970,688,376 8,034,224,236 7,245,089 54,897,932 225,402,817 1,371,410,158 18,648,392,151





Table 3: Descriptive statistics of former insiders, trades, and companies, continued 
Panel C
Outside stock, purchases
Mean Std Dev p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Former insider characteristics
Trade size ($) 24,754 129,807 37 1,400 5,846 17,520 84,643
Abnormal returns ($) 565 19,409 -3,467 -239 6 521 5,243
Portfolio size ($) 5,884,829 201,989,259 6,485 45,785 165,913 610,234 4,989,892
Days between declassification 
and transaction
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Firm characteristics
Market cap ($) 9,182,287,183 13,785,561,020 34,419,462 479,285,714 3,096,251,715 10,477,650,561 42,244,571,748




Mean Std Dev p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Former insider characteristics
Trade size ($) 31,424 352,586 176 2,336 7,703 21,793 103,500
Abnormal returns ($) 737 32,378 -4,378 -340 25 698 6,545
Portfolio size ($) 4,777,990 178,833,532 3,142 33,929 142,701 534,915 4,554,223
Days between declassification 
and transaction
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Firm characteristics
Market cap ($) 9,318,441,278 14,066,723,619 33,088,128 399,421,497 2,791,304,708 10,635,977,316 40,995,997,937
Book-to-market 0.68 0.87 0.09 0.27 0.50 0.81 1.80
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Table 3 shows additional descriptive statistics for former insiders who trade at least once in inside stock 
between Q1 2006 and Q3 2015. “Inside stock” indicates stock of companies at which the person was an 
insider, “outside stock” indicates stock of companies with which the insider was never affiliated. Panels A 
and B show statistics associated with former insiders’ trades in inside stock. Panels C and D show statistics 
associated with former insiders’ trades in outside stock. “Trade size” is denominated in US dollars and is 
self-explanatory; “Abnormal returns” refers to market-adjusted quarterly returns multiplied by trade size, 
in US dollars; “Portfolio size” is the dollar value of the former insider’s entire stock portfolio at the time of 
trade; “Days between declassification and transaction” refers to the passage of time between the departure 
from the inside of the former insider and the time of trade. The last two rows in each panel show 




Table 4: Raw and calendar-time abnormal returns for former insiders’ purchases and sales of 
inside stock 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buy Sell Buy-Sell Buy Sell Buy-Sell
Daily returns 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001 0.0003***
Annualized returns 0.137** 0.052 0.084*** 0.060*** -0.017 0.076***
t-statistic 2.24 0.94 4.63 3.17 -1.01 4.42
Average stocks in portfolio 50.6 84.5 135.1 50.6 84.5 135.1
Quarters 38 38 38 38 38 38
Trading days 2381 2381 2381 2381 2381 2381
Raw returns Risk-adjusted returns
 
 
Table 4 shows average daily and annualized raw returns (Columns 1-3) and risk-adjusted returns (Columns 
4-6) for a calendar-time portfolio trading strategy that mimics former insiders who trade in inside stock. 
Former insiders’ net trades are observed quarterly, and the trading strategy’s positions are taken accordingly 
and held for one quarter, resulting in approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. The portfolios are balanced 
each quarter. Columns 4-5 show results of daily portfolio returns minus the risk-free rate regressed on 
constructs aimed at capturing systematic risk. Specifically, the daily market return minus the risk-free rate, 
the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor UMD: Rpt – Rft = a + b1(Rmt 
– Rft) + b2SMBt + b3HMLt + b4UMDt + et. Column 6 shows results of daily Buy-Sell hedge portfolio returns 
minus the risk-free rate risk-adjusted as above. The annualization assumes 252 trading days per year. The 
sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during my sample period, and ii) 
who trade at least once in inside stock. The sample is based on the Swedish stock market and spans the 
period Q1, 2006 through Q4, 2015. “Inside stock” indicates stock of companies with which the person was 





Table 5: Former insiders’ purchases of outside stock 
 
 
Table 5 shows daily and annualized raw returns and risk-adjusted *returns for a calendar-time portfolio trading strategy that uses information on 
former insiders’ inside and outside trades. “Inside trades” is defined as trades in inside stock (i.e. stock of companies at which the person in question 
used to be an insider). “Outside trades” is refers to trades in stock of companies with which the former insider was never affiliated. Former insiders’ 
inside and outside net trades are observed quarterly, and the trading strategy’s positions are taken accordingly and held for one quarter, resulting in 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hedge 1 Hedge 2 Hedge 1 Hedge 2
[(2) - (1)] [(3) - (1)] [(2) - (1)] [(3) - (1)]
Daily returns 0.00037 0.00061** 0.00054** 0.00024*** 0.00018** 0.00026*** 0.00022***
Annualized returns 0.092 0.153** 0.137** 0.061*** 0.044** 0.066*** 0.056***
t-statistic 1.63 2.40 2.24 3.01 2.36 3.05 3.35
Average stocks in portfolio 65.3 35.7 50.6 101 115.9 101 115.9
Daily returns 0.00031 0.00059** 0.00054** 0.00029*** 0.00024*** 0.00028*** 0.00023***
Annualized returns 0.077 0.150** 0.137** 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.058***
t-statistic 1.54 2.43 2.24 4.24 3.81 4.14 3.75
Average stocks in portfolio 126.6 43.1 50.6 169.7 177.2 169.7 177.2
Daily returns 0.00029 0.00054** 0.00054** 0.00025*** 0.00025*** 0.00021*** 0.00022***
Annualized returns 0.074 0.135** 0.137** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.054***
t-statistic 1.30 2.22 2.24 3.65 3.96 3.27 3.59
Average stocks in portfolio 169.8 45.6 50.6 215.4 220.4 215.4 220.4











Panel C:  all outside stock purchases





approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. The portfolios are rebalanced each quarter. Panels A, B, C represent three different ways to match inside 
stock purchases to outside stock purchases, with respect to when they occur relative to each other. Column 1, Panel A shows results for outside stock 
purchases for which an inside stock purchase occurred in the same quarter as the outside purchase; Column 1, Panel B shows results for outside 
stock purchases for which an inside stock purchase occurred four quarters before or after the outside stock purchase; Column 1, Panel C, shows 
results for outside stock purchases regardless of whether there was a corresponding inside purchase. Analogously, Column 2 shows results for inside 
purchases for which matching outside purchases exist (according to the criteria in Panels A, B, and C). Column 3 shows results for inside purchases 
regardless of concurrence with outside purchases and shows identical results as Table 4, Column 1. Columns 4 and 5 show results of hedge portfolios 
that go long in inside stock and short in outside stock. Columns 6 and 7 show results of daily hedge portfolio returns regressed on constructs aimed 
at capturing systematic risk. Specifically, the daily market return minus the risk-free rate, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and 
the momentum factor UMD. The annualization assumes 252 trading days per year. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified 
as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside stock. The sample is based on the Swedish stock market and spans the 





Table 6: Former insiders’ sales of outside stock 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hedge 1 Hedge 2 Hedge 1 Hedge 2
[(2) - (1)] [(3) - (1)] [(2) - (1)] [(3) - (1)]
Daily returns 0.00034* 0.00031 0.00021 -0.00003 -0.00013* 0.00002 -0.00007
Annualized returns 0.086* 0.078 0.052 -0.008 -0.034* 0.005 -0.017
t-statistic 1.73 1.36 0.94 -0.41 -1.88 0.31 -1.18
Average stocks in portfolio 76.1 55.4 84.5 131.5 160.6 131.5 160.6
Daily returns 0.00033 0.00028 0.00021 -0.00005 -0.00012** -0.00004 -0.00011**
Annualized returns 0.083 0.071 0.052 -0.013 -0.031** -0.010 -0.027**
t-statistic 1.64 1.26 0.94 -0.95 -2.54 -0.79 -2.26
Average stocks in portfolio 137.2 68.8 84.5 206 221.7 206 221.7
Daily returns 0.00025 0.00026 0.00021 0.00000 -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00006
Annualized returns 0.064 0.064 0.052 0.001 -0.011 -0.004 -0.015
t-statistic 1.48 1.15 0.94 0.07 -0.97 -0.33 -1.28
Average stocks in portfolio 181.9 75.2 84.5 257.1 266.4 257.1 266.4
Raw returns Risk-adjusted returns
Inside stock sales with 






Panel B: outside stock sales made four quarters before or after an inside stock sales
Panel C:  all outside stock sales
Panel A: outside stock sales made in the same quarter as an inside stock sale
 
Table 6 shows daily and annualized raw returns and risk-adjusted returns for a calendar-time portfolio trading strategy that uses information on 
former insiders’ inside and outside trades. “Inside trades” is defined as trades in inside stock (i.e. stock of companies at which the person in question 
used to be an insider). “Outside trades” is refers to trades in stock of companies with which the former insider was never affiliated. Former insiders’ 
inside and outside net trades are observed quarterly, and the trading strategy’s positions are taken accordingly and held for one quarter, resulting in 
approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. The portfolios are rebalanced each quarter. Panels A, B, C represent three different ways to match inside 
stock sales to outside stock sales, with respect to when they occur relative to each other. Column 1, Panel A shows results for outside stock sales for 





an inside stock sale occurred four quarters before or after the outside stock sale; Column 1, Panel C, shows results for outside stock sales regardless 
of whether there was a corresponding inside stock sale. Analogously, Column 2 shows results for inside stock sales for which matching outside stock 
sales exist (according to the criteria in Panels A, B, and C). Column 3 shows results for inside stock sales regardless of concurrence with outside 
stock sales and shows identical results as Table 4, Column 2. Columns 4 and 5 show results of hedge portfolios that go long in inside stock and short 
in outside stock. Columns 6 and 7 show results of daily hedge portfolio returns regressed on constructs aimed at capturing systematic risk. 
Specifically, the daily market return minus the risk-free rate, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor UMD. 
The annualization assumes 252 trading days per year. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during my sample 




Figure 1: Risk-adjusted returns on trades in inside stock and time since declassification 
 
 
Figure 1 complements Table 7 below, and shows annualized risk-adjusted returns from a calendar-time 
portfolio strategy that mimics former insiders’ purchasing and selling behavior in inside stock—stock of 
companies at which the person in question used to be an insider— (Y axis) in relation to the number of 
quarters that have passed since the former insiders left the company with which they were affiliated (X 
axis). Former insiders’ net trades are observed quarterly, and the buy or sell trading strategy’s positions 
are taken accordingly and held for one quarter, resulting in approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. The 
portfolios are rebalanced each quarter. The risk-adjusted returns derive from daily portfolio returns minus 
the risk-free rate regressed on constructs aimed at capturing systematic risk. Specifically, the daily market 
return minus the risk-free rate, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum 
factor UMD. The annualization assumes 252 trading days per year. The sample is based on Swedish 
insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in 
































Purchases of inside stock Sales of inside stock
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Table 7: Abnormal returns and time since declassification 
Panel A. Purchases of inside stock  
1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20
Daily raw returns 0.0007*** 0.0006** 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
Annualized raw returns 0.18*** 0.142** 0.084 0.103 0.078
t-statistic 2.72 2.12 1.19 1.38 1.10
Daily risk-adjusted returns 0.0004*** 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Annualized risk-adjusted returns 0.104*** 0.061** 0.004 0.013 -0.006
t-statistic 3.64 2.04 0.11 0.34 -0.15




Panel B. Sales of inside stock 
1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20
Daily raw returns 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0004
Annualized raw returns 0.083 0.071 0.106* 0.045 0.100
t-statistic 1.38 1.17 1.78 0.74 1.64
Daily risk-adjusted returns 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Annualized risk-adjusted returns 0.013 -0.005 0.035 -0.028 0.028
t-statistic 0.56 -0.21 1.24 -0.91 0.8




Panel C. Purchases of inside stock – Sales of inside stock 
 
 
Table 7 complements Figure 1 above, and shows daily and annualized raw returns and risk-
adjusted returns for a calendar-time portfolio trading strategy that that mimics former 
1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20
Daily raw returns 0.0004*** 0.0003** -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001
Annualized raw returns 0.098*** 0.071** -0.023 0.059 -0.022
t-statistic 3.09 2.02 -0.54 1.26 -0.459
Daily risk-adjusted returns 0.0004*** 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001
Annualized risk-adjusted returns 0.092*** 0.065* -0.031 0.041 -0.033
t-statistic 2.94 1.92 -0.77 0.91 -0.72




insiders’ purchasing and selling behavior in inside stock (stock of companies at which the 
person in question used to be an insider) in relation to the number of quarters that have passed 
since the former insiders left the company with which they were affiliated. Former insiders’ 
inside net trades are observed quarterly, and the trading strategy’s positions are taken 
accordingly and held for one quarter, resulting in approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. 
The portfolios are rebalanced each quarter. Panel A shows results for inside stock purchases 
and Panel B shows results for inside stock sales. Panel C shows the results for the hedge 
portfolio Purchases minus Sales. The risk-adjusted returns derive from daily portfolio returns 
minus the risk-free rate regressed on constructs aimed at capturing systematic risk. 
Specifically, the daily market return minus the risk-free rate, the size factor SMB, the book-
to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor UMD. The annualization assumes 252 
trading days per year. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as 
insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside stock. The sample 




Table 8: Correlations of main continuous variables 
Panel A. The subsample of former insiders buying inside stock 
 
 
Panel B. The subsample of former insiders selling inside stock  
TradeSize BM BHAR BHAR_lag MV AfterDays Ties
TradeSize 1 -0.165 0.035 0.035 0.119 -0.138 0.063
BM -0.099 1 -0.001 -0.007 -0.138 0.024 0.067
BHAR 0.027 0.011 1 0.054 0.019 0.031 0.040
BHAR_lag 0.096 0.004 0.059 1 0.008 0.009 -0.008
MV 0.137 -0.100 0.044 0.063 1 0.059 0.562
AfterDays -0.121 -0.011 0.020 -0.007 0.055 1 -0.270
Ties 0.064 -0.003 0.018 -0.048 0.590 -0.302 1
 
Table 8 shows Pearson (Spearman) correlations for the main continuous variables in my cross-
sectional buy-and-hold abnormal returns tests above (below) the diagonal. Panel A shows 
correlations for the subsample containing former insiders who purchases inside stock, and Panel B 
shows correlations for the subsample containing former insiders who sell inside stock. “Inside stock” 
is defined as stock of companies at which the person in question used to be an insider. TradeSize is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the value of the observed trade (in Swedish krona); BM denotes 
the ratio between book-value of equity and market value of equity of the company for which a trade 
is observed; BHAR is the quarterly stock-specific raw return minus the return on a Swedish 
benchmark index; BHAR_lag denotes the previous quarter’s quarterly BHAR; MV is the natural 
logarithm of firm market value; AfterDays shows how many days have passed between the day on 
which the former insider was declassified as an insider and the day on which I observe a purchase 
(Panel A) or sale (Panel B) of inside stock. Ties is the number of current insiders, at the time the trade 
is observed, with whom the former insider was a concurrent insider. The sample is based on Swedish 
insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once 
in inside stock. The sample is based on the Swedish stock market and spans the period Q1, 2006 
through Q4, 2015. 
  
TradeSize BM BHAR BHAR_lag MV AfterDays Ties
TradeSize 1 -0.100 0.039 0.056 0.103 -0.078 0.101
BM -0.063 1 0.020 0.033 -0.156 0.017 0.028
BHAR 0.020 0.051 1 0.022 0.041 -0.025 0.075
BHAR_lag 0.090 0.045 -0.006 1 0.054 -0.004 0.008
MV 0.081 -0.171 0.052 0.116 1 0.070 0.589
AfterDays -0.087 0.023 -0.038 0.003 0.068 1 -0.269
Ties 0.066 -0.019 0.056 -0.028 0.587 -0.314 1
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Table 9: Initial multivariate analyses of future abnormal returns 
 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept -0.03892 -1.07 -0.03576 -1.13
Ties 0.00130* 1.82 0.00194*** 3.22
AfterDays -0.00001** -2.07 0.00002*** 4.81
#Insiderships -0.01203*** -3.27 -0.00549** -2.21
HighPosition 0.00472 0.77 -0.00301 -0.70
TradeSize 0.00343*** 3.17 0.00175** 2.00
BM 0.00141 0.38 0.00065 0.23
BHAR_lag 0.0154* 1.76 0.0813*** 8.83












BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1Tiesi,j,t + b2AfterDaysi,j,t + b3#Insidershipsi,j,t + 
b4HighPositioni,j,t + b5TradeSizei,j,t + b6BMj,t + b7BHAR_lagj,t + b8MVj,t + 
ei,j,t 
Table 9 shows results of robust OLS regressions of next-quarter market-adjusted BHAR, 
separate for purchases and sales of inside stock. “Inside stock” is defined as stock of 
companies at which the person in question used to be an insider. TradeSize is defined as 
the natural logarithm of the value of the observed trade (in Swedish krona); BM denotes 
the ratio between book-value of equity and market value of equity of the company for 
which a trade is observed; BHAR is the quarterly stock-specific raw return minus the 
return on a Swedish benchmark index; BHAR_lag denotes the previous quarter’s quarterly 
BHAR; MV is the natural logarithm of firm market value; AfterDays shows how many 
days have passed between the day on which the former insider was declassified as an 
insider and the day on which I observe a purchase (Column 1) or sale (Column 2) of inside 
stock. Ties is the number of current insiders, at the time the trade is observed, with whom 
the former insider was a concurrent insider; #Insiderships is defined as the number of 
companies at which a given former insider has had an inside position, in the sample 
period; HighPosition is a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the former insider was 
a CEO, vice president, and/or board member at the company at which he or she was an 
insider. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during 
my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside stock. The sample is based on 




Table 10: Quintile analyses of Ties and AfterDays 
 
Panel A. Quarterly market-adjusted BHAR for the Ties quintiles 
Ties
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
BHARt+1 -0.009 0.009 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.030***
t-statistic 1.38 1.57 5.10 4.21 4.04 3.57
n 845 676 786 798 713
 
Panel B. Quarterly market-adjusted BHAR for the AfterDays quintiles 
AfterDays
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
BHARt+1 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.009 0.004 -0.015*
t-statistic 3.05 3.16 2.98 1.14 0.72 -1.81
n 763 762 765 763 765
 
Table 10 consist of two panels, each showing descriptive statistics for next-quarter 
abnormal returns, for five mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive partitions of 
the main sample for subsequent tests. This main sample consists of former insiders who 
purchase inside stock after declassification as insiders (it is slightly smaller than in Tables 
2 and 3 due to additional data requirements). “Inside stock” is defined as stock of 
companies at which the person in question used to be an insider. In Panel A, the sample 
has been sorted into quintiles based on Ties (the number of current insiders, at the time 
the trade is observed, with whom the former insider was a concurrent insider). In Panel 
B, the same sample has been sorted into quintiles base on AfterDays (the number of days 
that have passed between the day on which the former insider was declassified as an 
insider and the day on which I observe a purchase of inside stock). Observations in 
Quintile 1 have the lowest number of ties (Panel A) and are most recently declassified 
(Panel B). BHARt+1 in this table represents the average stock-specific quarterly raw return 
minus the return on a Swedish benchmark index. The last column in both panels shows 
the difference in average abnormal return when moving from the lowest quintile to the 
highest. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as insiders 
during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside stock. The sample is 











Table 11: Multivariate analyses of the interaction effects of Ties and AfterDays on future abnormal returns 
Dependent variable: next-quarter market-adjusted BHAR. 
 
Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Intercept 0.013235 0.41 -0.026221 -0.77 0.008475 0.24 0.002822 0.08 0.032173 0.95 0.032097 0.95
AfterDays -0.000008* -1.76 -0.000027*** -3.05
Ties 0.001377** 2.07 -0.000198 -0.20 -0.000415 -0.35
AfterDays_Q -0.002577 -1.33 -0.009602*** -3.06
Ties_Q 0.007019*** 2.94 -0.000591 -0.17 0.000337 0.08
Ties x AfterDays 0.000002** 1.96
Ties_Q x AfterDays_Q 0.002550** 2.01
AfterDays_Q2 -0.017353 -1.08 -0.012843 -0.82
AfterDays_Q3 -0.021866 -1.35 -0.014772 -0.97
AfterDays_Q4 -0.027885* -1.76 -0.026099* -1.77
AfterDays_Q5 -0.044105*** -2.85 -0.028627** -2.02
Ties x AfterDays_Q2 0.001951 1.28
Ties x AfterDays_Q3 0.001640 1.02
Ties x AfterDays_Q4 0.001641 1.01
Ties x AfterDays_Q5 0.004488*** 2.60
Ties_Q x AfterDays_Q2 0.005835 1.06
Ties_Q x AfterDays_Q3 0.003639 0.66
Ties_Q x AfterDays_Q4 0.007272 1.29
Ties_Q x AfterDays_Q5 0.010854* 1.92
BM -0.002794 -0.79 -0.000635 -0.18 0.000457 0.12 -0.000668 -0.18 -0.002866 -0.81 -0.003192 -0.90
BHAR_lag 0.007153 0.71 0.014843* 1.70 0.017904** 2.03 0.016846* 1.91 0.007366 0.73 0.007694 0.76
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3526 3526 3526 3526











BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3AfterDaysi,j,t×Tiesi,j,t + b4BMj,t + b5BHAR_lagj,t +  b6MVj,t + ei,j,t 
  
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1AfterDays_Qi,j,t + b2Ties_Qi,j,t + b3AfterDays_Qi,j,t×Ties_Qi,j,t + b4BMj,t + b5BHAR_lagj,t + b6MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1Tiesi,j,t + b2AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + b3AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + b4AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b5AfterDays_Q5i,j,t + 
b6Tiesi,j,t×AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + b7Tiesi,j,t×AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + b8Tiesi,j,t×AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b9Tiesi,j,t×AfterDaysQ5i,j,t + b10BMj,t + b11BHAR_ 
lagj,t + b12MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
BHARi,j,t+1 = a + b1Ties_Qi,j,t + b2AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + b3AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + b4AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b5AfterDays_Q5i,j,t + 
b6Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q2i,j,t + b7Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q3i,j,t + b8Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q4i,j,t + b9Ties_Qi,j,t×AfterDays_Q5i,j,t + b10BMj,t + 
b11BHAR_ lagj,t +  b12MVj,t + ei,j,t 
 
Table 11 shows results of robust OLS regressions of six different specifications, nested in the equations above. The underlying sample 
consists of former insiders who purchase inside stock after declassification as insiders. This sample is sorted into two sets of five mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive partitions, based on AfterDays and Ties, respectively. AfterDays is the number of days that have 
passed between the day on which the former insider was declassified as an insider and the day on which I observe a purchase of inside 
stock. Ties is the number of current insiders, at the time the trade is observed, with whom the former insider was a concurrent insider. 
“Inside stock” is defined as stock of companies at which the person in question used to be an insider. AfterDays_Q and Ties_Q are based 
on the quintile sorting and range from 1 through 5. Variables ending with the suffix Qi, i in {2, 3, 4, 5}, are quintile indicator variables. 
BM denotes the ratio between book-value of equity and market value of equity of the company for which a trade is observed; BHAR is the 
quarterly stock-specific raw return minus the return on a Swedish benchmark index; BHAR_lag denotes the previous quarter’s quarterly 
BHAR. The sample is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least 











Table 12: Value-relevant information and the probability of a former insider buying inside stock 
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
Intercept 0.080830*** 19.51 0.0806*** 19.38 0.08037*** 24.37 0.08029*** 24.35
AfterDays -0.00002*** -6.07 -0.00002*** -6.03 -0.00001*** -6.21 -0.00001*** -6.15
Ties 0.00112*** 3.61 0.00115*** 3.71 0.00106*** 4.01 0.00104*** 3.94
AnnRet 0.03878** 2.09 0.08122 1.37
AnnRet×AfterDays 0.00000 -0.11
AnnRet×Ties -0.00502 -1.05














P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3AnnRetj,t+1 + ei,j,t 
P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3AnnRetj,t+1 + b4AfterDaysi,j,t×AnnRetj,t+1 + b5Tiesi,j,t×AnnReti,j,t+1 + ei,j,t 
P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3BHARj,t+1 + ei,j,t 
 P(Buyt = 1) = a + b1AfterDaysi,j,t + b2Tiesi,j,t + b3BHARj,t+1 + b4AfterDaysi,j,t×BHARj,t+1 + b5Tiesi,j,t×BHARj,t+1 + ei,j,t 
 
Table 12 shows results of four linear probability models, estimated using robust OLS regressions, that address the likelihood of a 
former insider purchasing inside stock. “Inside stock” is defined as stock of companies at which the person in question used to be 
an insider. The underlying sample contains observations of former insiders’ quarterly net changes in holdings of inside stock 
(negative change, no change, positive change). For each model specification, the dependent variable is the indicator Buyt, which 
takes on the value of 1 if the former insider purchased inside stock and 0 otherwise. AfterDays is the number of days that have 
passed between the day on which the former insider was declassified as an insider and the day on which I observe a purchase of 





insider. AnnRet is defined as the market return in a three-day window surrounding the quarterly earnings announcement. The sample 
is based on Swedish insiders who i) are declassified as insiders during my sample period, and ii) who trade at least once in inside 








Table 13: Heatmaps of the association between Buy and future abnormal returns for 25 combinations of Ties and AfterDays quintiles 
Panel A. Pearson correlations between Buyi,j,t and BHARj,t+1 
1 2 3 4 5
1 0.010 0.036 -0.004 0.044 0.015
2 0.012 0.023 0.040 0.029 0.074
3 -0.057 0.000 0.016 0.036 0.036
4 0.000 0.007 -0.019 0.032 0.042
















Panel B. Estimates of β in the linear probability model P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = Intercept + β×BHARj,t+1  
 
Table 13, shows two heatmaps, one based on Pearson correlations (Panel A) and one based on covariates from a robust OLS regression (Panel B). 
The underlying sample consists of former insiders who may or may not purchase inside stock after declassification as insiders. This sample is sorted 
into two sets of five mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive partitions, based on AfterDays and Ties, respectively. AfterDays is the number 
of days that have passed between the day on which the former insider was declassified as an insider and the day on which I observe a purchase of 
1 2 3 4 5
0.059 0.051 0.029 0.056 0.082**
(1.250) (1.230) (0.731) (1.570) (1.972)
-0.017 0.023 0.122*** 0.073* 0.211***
(-0.337) (0.698) (2.867) (1.884) (4.637)
-0.095*** 0.03 0.062 0.120*** 0.109**
(-2.868) (0.971) (1.458) (2.905) (2.016)
-0.003 0.051 -0.045 0.138*** 0.054
(-0.112) (1.199) (-0.992) (3.268) (0.916)
-0.061** 0.015 0.086* 0.111** 0.095






















inside stock. Ties is the number of current insiders with whom the former insider was a concurrent insider. “Inside stock” is defined as stock of 
companies at which the person in question used to be an insider. Panel A, shows a heatmap of Pearson correlations between Buy (a binary variable 
indicating whether a former insider purchased inside stock in a given quarter) and next-quarter BHAR (the quarterly stock-specific raw return minus 
the return on a Swedish benchmark index). Correlations are calculated for each of the 25 AfterDays×Ties quintile combinations. Similarly, Panel B 
shows estimates of β in the linear probability model P(Buyi,j,t = 1) = a + β×BHARj,t+1 + ei,j,t, estimated using robust OLS regressions for each of the 
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Appendix A1: notable U.S. court cases regarding transmission of inside information 
 
i) In Chiarella v. United States (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that a printer employee who 
traded on information obtained via his profession did not violate any laws since “a duty to 
disclose under section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information.”24 
 
ii) In United States v. O’Hagan (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that a partner of a law firm, 
who overheard private information and subsequently traded on it, was found liable of 
unlawful insider trading. The Court argued that although the defendant did not breach 
fiduciary trust vis-à-vis the company in whose securities he traded, the trades constituted 
illegal insider trading since the defendant did owe fiduciary duty to his law firm not to trade 
based on private information obtained as a result of his employment. O’Hagan established 
a complementary view on insider-trading liability, known as the “misappropriation 
theory.”25 
 
iii) In United States v. Newman (2014), a district court ruled that a person trading on received 
inside information must have known that the information was inside information and also 
that the insider who provided him or her with said information did so without the consent 
of the principal.26 
 
                                                          
24 Justice Powell in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
25 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
26 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2014). 
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iv) In Salman v. United States (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the benefit a tipper 
has to receive as predicate for an insider-trader prosecution of a tippee need not be 
pecuniary, and that giving a “gift” of a tip to a family member presumably benefits the 
tipper. The legality of gratuitous tipping outside the “friends and family” relationship 
remains unclear, as does the question of whether tippees must be aware of any upstream 
breaches of fiduciary trust for criminal liability.  
Appendix A2: ties to current insiders using calendar-time portfolios 
In this test, I revisit the issue of whether the ability of former insiders to earn abnormal 
returns is positively associated with the number of connections to remaining insiders the former 
insider has at the time of trade. In contrast to the test of this association in the main text, this test 
is conducted using a calendar-time portfolio strategy. As before, the underlying idea is that the 
more connections to the inside the former insider retains, the higher the probability that he or she 
receives private information. The number of remaining ties to the inside ought not to be correlated 
with the former insider’s ability to contextualize public information through retained private 
information. I again define Ties as persons who were insiders at the time the former insider was 
an insider, and who are still insiders at the time of the former insider’s trade.  
To control for the passage of time since declassification, I first partition my sample of 
former insider purchases into two subsamples, based on whether the trade occurs in quarters 1-10 
or 11-20 since declassification.27 The effect of Ties on abnormal returns is examined separately 
for these subsamples. Unfortunately, the small sample size precludes me from partitioning the 
trades, with respect to Ties, with enough precision to show meaningful variation. This is 
particularly true for the subsample comprising trades made 1-10 quarters after declassification, 
                                                          
27 The double-sorting nature of this test does not permit me to do finer partitioning, the number of observations per 
portfolio would be too small.  
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when almost all of the former insiders in my sample have a large number of ties. Creating calendar-
time portfolios for each of the 2,381 trading days in my sample period requires that I allow for no 
fewer than four ties to current insiders. With this constraint, the average daily portfolio contains 
only 6.6 stocks, making the trading strategy highly susceptible to outliers.28 There are similar 
concerns with the subsample of trades occurring 11-20 quarters after declassification. 
I circumvent these problems by instead looking at the marginal effect on abnormal returns 
of sequentially altering the trade inclusion criterion; the number of ties to the inside. In principle, 
this could be done in two ways: either by fixing the lower bound—i.e. zero ties to the inside—and 
investigating how abnormal returns are affected by gradually allowing for more ties, or, 
analogously, by fixing the upper bound and requiring more ties for inclusion. Succinctly, the idea 
is to study the marginal effect of the number of ties to the inside on abnormal returns by fixing the 
lower (upper) bound and altering the upper (lower) bound of the inclusion criterion. The former 
alternative suffers from the same small-sample problem, described above, and I hence opt for the 
latter. The upper bound is set to the sample median number of ties to the inside, 10.29 Table A1 
shows results for former-insider purchases made 1-10 quarters after declassification (Panel A) and 
for former-insider purchases made 11-20 quarters after declassification (Panel B). Figure A1 
contrasts the marginal effect of ties to the inside on abnormal returns for trades made close to and 
long since declassification. 
Table A1, Panel A shows that both raw and risk-adjusted returns are significant and stable. 
The marginal effect of sequentially excluding former insiders with fewer than one, two, three, four, 
                                                          
28 Imposing the condition of zero ties to the inside for the same subsample results in portfolios for only 1880 out of 2,381, 
with an average of 2.8 shares. An additional concern is that former insiders with zero ties to the inside soon after 
declassification may not be representative for the full sample of former insiders. 
29 If the upper bound is “too large” (e.g. the maximum number of ties), the marginal effect of gradually omitting 
trades of insiders with very few ties becomes too diluted. Altering the upper bound around the median, however, do 
not change the conclusions of this section. 
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and five ties to the inside is negligible. I conjecture that this is due to the fact that most former 
insiders likely have numerous ties to the inside in the subsample period (1-10 quarters after 
declassification), preventing me from establishing whether Ties is a mechanism through which 
former insiders earn abnormal returns on inside stock.  
 Panel B shows an almost monotonic increase in both raw and abnormal returns when 
excluding former insiders with increasingly less few ties to the inside; excluding former insiders 
with the lowest number of ties to the inside leads to significant abnormal returns also for trades 
that take place further from declassification. The evidence is consistent with ties to current insiders 
being a valid mechanism through which former insiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns operates, 
at least for trades occurring further from the declassification date. Though not dispositive, this test 
is consistent with the findings of Section 4: having ties to current insiders seem to become more 
important for former insiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns the further away from the 




Table A1: Abnormal returns and ties to current insiders 
 
Table A1 shows daily and annualized raw returns (minus the risk-free rate) and risk-adjusted returns for a 
calendar-time portfolio trading strategy that uses information on former insiders’ inside purchases, in 
relation to the number of ties that the former insider has to current high-information insiders. “High-
information insiders” is defined as CEOs, Vice Presidents and board members. “Inside trades” is defined 
as trades in formerly inside stock. Panel A shows results for purchases that occur 1 to 10 quarters after the 
former insider was declassified, and Panel B shows results for purchases that occur 11 to 20 quarters after 
the former insider was declassified. Each column represents the allowed number of ties the former insider 
may have to be included in the analysis. Conditional on inclusion, former insiders’ inside net trades are 
observed quarterly, and the trading strategy’s positions are taken accordingly and held for one quarter, 
resulting in approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. The portfolios are reconfigured each quarter. The risk 
adjustment is made by regressing daily portfolio returns minus the risk-free rate on constructs aimed at 
capturing systematic risk. Specifically, the daily market return minus the risk-free rate, the size factor SMB, 
the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor UMD. The annualization assumes 252 trading 
days per year.  
  
Panel A: Purchases of inside stock 1-10 quarters after declassification
0-10 1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10
Daily raw returns 0.00050 0.00053 0.00052 0.00051 0.00053 0.00052
Annualized raw returns 0.127 0.133 0.130 0.129 0.133 0.131
t-value 2.11 2.15 2.11 2.07 2.12 2.07
Daily risk-adjusted returns 0.00024 0.00026 0.00025 0.00024 0.00025 0.00023
Annualized risk-adjusted returns 0.061 0.065 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.058
t-value 2.39 2.57 2.47 2.33 2.41 2.24
Average stocks in portfolio 29.7 27.5 27.2 26.5 25.5 23.7
Panel B: Purchases of inside stock 11-20 quarters after declassification
0-10 1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10
Daily raw returns 0.00040 0.00046 0.00048 0.00053 0.00058 0.00056
Annualized raw returns 0.100 0.115 0.122 0.134 0.146 0.142
t-value 1.54 1.72 1.81 1.96 2.11 2.00
Daily risk-adjusted returns 0.00008 0.00013 0.00015 0.00018 0.00023 0.00020
Annualized risk-adjusted returns 0.016 0.025 0.029 0.037 0.044 0.037
t-value 0.76 1.17 1.34 1.65 1.95 1.62
Average stocks in portfolio 23.8 22.2 21.3 19.6 17.8 15.1
Number of ties to current high-information insiders
Number of ties to current high-information insiders
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 Figure A1: Risk-adjusted returns on trades in inside stock and ties to current insiders 
 
Figure A1 shows annualized risk-adjusted returns from a calendar-time portfolio strategy that mimics 
former insiders’ purchasing behavior in inside stock (Y axis) in relation to the number of ties that the 
former insider has to current high-information insiders (X axis). “High-information insiders” is defined 
as CEOs, Vice Presidents and board members. “Inside trades” is defined as trades in formerly inside 
stock. The darker line shows results for purchases that occur 1 to 10 quarters after the former insider 
was declassified, and the lighter line shows results for purchases that occur 11 to 20 quarters after the 
former insider was declassified. Each X axis tick marker represents the allowed number of ties the 
former insider may have to be included in the analysis. Conditional on inclusion, former insiders’ inside 
net trades are observed quarterly, and the trading strategy’s positions are taken accordingly and held 
for one quarter, resulting in approximately 63 daily portfolio returns. The portfolios are reconfigured 
each quarter. The risk adjustment is made by regressing daily portfolio returns minus the risk-free rate 
on constructs aimed at capturing systematic risk. Specifically, the daily market return minus the risk-
free rate, the size factor SMB, the book-to-market factor HML, and the momentum factor UMD. The 
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